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Abstract—Applying separation of concerns approaches into
business process context generally results in several initiatives
oriented to automatic generation of aspect code, generation
of specific code according to the kind of concern (code for
mapping roles and permissions derived from RBAC model
for example), or proposition of new mechanisms as dedicated
aspectual languages. Most of these initiatives only consider
functional behaviours of business process, omitting special
behaviours derived from quality attributes such as security,
which can be modelled as concerns that must be supported in
the business process. In this paper we propose the integration
of cross-cuttings standardized control access policies (based
on RBAC model and Oasis XACML) into legacy business
processes, using a separation of concerns approach.
Keywords-Security Standards, Separation of Concerns, Busi-
ness Processes, Service–oriented Architecture.
Note for the proceeding reader: this paper makes use of
colors. Although not mandatory for its understanding, an
online (colored) version of this paper will ease the reading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing complex software is known to be a tedious
task. From a technical point of view, it implies to use mul-
tiple paradigms (and the associated frameworks), and con-
sists of thousands of artifacts (e.g., documentation, models,
requirements, unit tests). To fill the gap between the tech-
nical and enterprise points of views, the Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA) paradigm [1] promotes the design of
complex software as the collaboration of decoupled ser-
vices. According to this paradigm, these collaborations are
reified as business processes, designed by business experts
according to their concerns. These processes are supported
by existing norm such as the Business Process Execution
Language (BPEL, [2]). However, the SOA paradigm does not
support cross–cuttings concerns (e.g., security, persistence)
per se; business experts design tangled processes, tangling
both functional and cross–cuttings concerns together at the
process level. This situation increases systems’ entropy1,
leading to the deployment of inefficient processes (e.g., anti-
patterns [3]).
1According to Princeton’s WordNet, entropy is “a quantity representing
the amount of energy in a system that is no longer available for doing
work”. It is interpreted as the degree of disorder or randomness in the
modeled system.
Moreover, the quality requirements imposed in industry
rely on several norms or standardized policies (e.g., Oa-
sis XACML, Oasis SAML, WS-SECURITYPOLICY, WS-
TRUST, etc). These policies may be interpreted differently
(according to the associated business context and stakehold-
ers), leading to misunderstanding issues and avoiding their
reuse in another context. Separation of Concerns (SoC) ad-
vocates the design of large systems through the composition
of elementary artifacts. This paradigm provides powerful
mechanisms to support the design of complex business
processes, as it naturally handles cross–cutting concerns.
SoC is a good candidate to support the implementation of
standardized composition mechanism for integrating sepa-
rated concerns into the final system.
The ultimate goal of this work is to automate the inte-
gration of cross–cuttings standardized policies (focusing on
security, using the XACML profile for the Role-Based Access
Control model - RBAC) into legacy business processes,
using a separation of concerns approach. The immediate
benefits are the reduction of management and the reuse of
previously built RBAC services. To illustrate the approach,
we use the Car Crash Crisis Management System (CCCMS)
case study, defined as a framework to compare several
approaches dealing with separation of concerns [4]. We
describe in this contribution how a SoC approach can be
used to integrate XACML artifacts into existing business
processes.
II. RUNNING EXAMPLE: THE CCCMS
Kienzle et al. [4] propose a common case study - a Car
Crash Crisis Management System, CCCMS - to compare
existing Aspect Oriented Modeling approaches with each
other. According to the definition given by this case study,
the CCCMS“includes all the functionalities of general crisis
management systems, and some additional features specific
to car crashes such as facilitating the rescuing of victims at
the crisis scene and the use of tow trucks to remove damaged
vehicles.” The requirements document defines ten use cases,
described using textual scenario. Each scenario defines the
flow of actions to handle a crisis (e.g., retrieve witness
identity, contact firemen located near to the crash location).
We use this case study as a running example to illustrate the
problem tackled in this paper and the contribution we made.
A. Introducing Security into Legacy Processes
Traditionally, secure specifications that are part of busi-
ness processes are implemented as modifications of the
business processes themselves. Consequently a non-secure
business process is modified to deal with specific secure
operations (e.g., authentication). In the CCCMS, we have
to deal with secure operations such authentication, access
control and encryption.
When several secure operations are involved, security
services are invoked several times, producing a repetitive use
of security controls. For example, if user authentication is
required before invoking any critical operation, the business
process is modified to deal with this concern. But when
several security services are involved, user can be asked to
authenticate several times in the same business process. The
problem is even more complex, when several concerns apply
to the same process business. Indeed, each new aspect in
turn may require security checks. The problem of repetitive
checks and late detections of denial of access is then difficult
to identify.
One important approach for managing security is repre-
sented by the development of policy-based security services
in order to provide security operations relevant to business
processes. Security is a complex task that cannot be achieved
by a single service, multiple coordinated services are needed.
Using a policy-based approach increases flexibility, reduces
software development costs, and simplifies security man-
agement. Changes in security requirements simply involve
changing policies without requiring changes to the software,
business processes and/or access control and authentication
mechanisms.
B. RBAC and XACML
Access control is a strategy for protecting information in a
system; it is performed by defining roles associated to access
permissions over specific resources. Access authorization is
explicitly described through policies or permissions. Gener-
ally access control includes access security sub-features such
authentication (degree to which the identity of a subject or
resource is checked), compliance (adherence to standards,
conventions or regulations), and integrity (degree to which
a system or component prevents unauthorized access to, or
modification of, programs or data).
The RBAC model is a generalized approach for access
control where roles represent functions defined in an or-
ganization and the permissions (e.g., ability or right to
perform some action on a resource, possibly under certain
conditions previously specified) depend of roles rather than
users. Authorizations associated to a role are strictly related
to data objects and resources that are necessary to perform
the operations associated with that role. Users are simply
allowed to play the appropriate role. The main benefit of
adopting RBAC is to simplify the definition of security
policies for business users who do not have knowledge of
software.
The OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) standard is a proposal to specify and
enforce access control policies independent of any software
platform. XACML (currently version 3.0) has become the de
facto standard for specifying access control policies widely
used in Web servers. Since 2004, OASIS has defined a
XACML profile for RBAC in order to link RBAC practi-
cal solutions in web services environments2. Management
of privileges in a distributed environment, based designs
on RBAC solutions, gives greater control of privileges,
decreasing the complexity involved in this process. The
XACML-RBAC profile also enables the management of
security policies in a distributed environment. XACML al-
lows administrators to define access control requirements for
protecting resources. The access decision language XACML
is used for representing a query that asks if a particular
action should be allowed on a resource. If the service finds a
policy for the consulted resource, the attributes in the request
are compared with the attributes listed in the policy rules.
Finally, the control access service provides a response which
determines if the request should be allowed for that resource
using one of four values: Permit, Deny, Indeterminate (query
was failed or a required value was missed, so the service
cannot make a decision) or Not Applicable (the request
cannot be answered by a service).
The XACML architecture establishes the presence of three
key components in the access control to resources: the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP)
and Policy Information Point (PIP). A XACML control
access process involves the following steps:
1) An user sends to a PEP a request for accessing to a
resource.
2) The PEP forms a new request with attributes of
the subject, resource and action, and sends this new
request to a PDP.
3) The PDP analyzes the new request and obtains a policy
or set of policies that apply to the new request from
a policy repository.
4) The PDP queries to PIP service in order to obtain the
values of attributes related to the subject, resource, or
context, that are in the politics, and get a response
with the values of these attributes.
5) The PDP compares the attributes of the request sent in
step 2 against attributes contained in the politics’ rules
and makes a response about whether or not should be
allowed access. This response is sent to the PEP, which
can allow or deny access to the user.
2Profile of XACML 3.0 for RBAC can be found in http://docs.oasis-
open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-rbac-v1-spec-cd-03-en.pdf
III. REIFYING SECURITY AS A CONCERN
A RBAC artifact may be considered as a concern (e.g.,
aspects weaving), and its application could be extended to
a set of services, applications or business processes, if it
exists a mechanism for adding compositions of services
in a particular business process and considering security
operations at the level of role-based control access policies.
SoC using aspect-based techniques has been widely ac-
cepted as a mechanism to encapsulate functional and non-
functional features into reusable modules over a software
solution; it can increase the level of abstraction by identi-
fying common characteristics (which is a targeted goal of
business process development).
A. SoC and quality attributes
The use of SoC and aspects are extended to the treatment
of quality attributes (as security and its derived implications,
e.g., control access) so that business processes managed
within a workflow consider additional features to func-
tionality [5], [6]. Understanding access control as a non-
functional concern that cross-cuts the functional part of a
system raises suitable considerations for a solution based on
aspect-oriented programming [7].
In most contemporary SOA practices focused on the
separation of concerns, the properties related with quality
attributes are specified and mapped in a set of services.
This strategy involves that developers and SOA architects
must configure properly the quality attributes in a range
of services (usually every quality attribute covers multiple
services simultaneously).
Consistent specification and validation of non-functional
properties over a set of services of a complex business pro-
cess, is a tedious, costly and error prone process. Therefore,
it is necessary to specify attributes of quality for business
processes rather than services, reducing costs and surcharges
in the development and application maintenance. Unfortu-
nately, UML, BPMN and BPEL do not support separation of
concerns per se [8]. The use of concerns managed by models
allows us to adjust service orchestrations in high level
of abstraction, so that business processes can be enriched
with additional features [9] without major modifications or
changes in code-level source.
B. Taming CCCMS Complexity Using ADORE
The ADORE approach [10] provides a compositional tech-
nique for modeling complex orchestrations, where models
describe small orchestrations of services that are composed
to produce a model that describes an orchestration of a wide
range of services [6]. Small models, called orchestration
fragments, describe different aspects of a complex business.
In [11] authors expose how ADORE method was applied
in order to separate and compose process aspects in a SOA
design of the CCCMS. They define service orchestrations
from basic flow of use cases, and fragments of orchestra-
tion from alternative flows of use cases and non-functional
requirements specification. All orchestrations are made by
calls to services (even the fragments themselves), due to
ADORE focus on the modeling of orchestrations rather than
modeling the internal behavior of services or activities.
Fragment authentifyWhenIdle
P
a1 (still) := cms::notIdle(u)
S
h hook(u)
still
a21 cms::killAuthentification(u)
!still
a2 (auth) := cms::authUser(u)
auth
t throw('BadAuthentification')
!auth
We use here the graphical representation defined by ADORE to
represent business processes. Boxes represent activities (e.g.,
message reception, service invocation), and arrows represent
causality relations (i.e., the associated partial order). A wait
relation (a → b) means that b will wait for the end of a to
start its own execution. A guard relation (a v→ b) strengthens
the wait semantics, and conditions the start of b to the value of
v. In this example, relations are combined using a conjunctive
semantics (∧).
Figure 1. AuthentifyWhenIdle concern defined with ADORE.
Figure 1 presents an example of an ADORE fragment
called authentifyWhenIdle. It implements one of the security
requirements specified in the CCCMS. Thus, It can be
integrated in any orchestration that requires this behavior.
The fragment manages the services invoked when an idle
employee of CCCMS must be reauthenticated (no active
interaction in the last 30 minutes). This fragment contains
four activities: a1 activity queries about inactive time of user;
a21 activity is the invocation of a service to finish the user
session if inactivity is detected; a2 activity is the new in-
vocation of an authentication service, and t that implements
error throwing if user does not re-authenticate properly. h or
hook (in ADORE terminology) represents where the fragment
will be connected into an existing orchestration. P represents
hook predecessor and S represents hook successors in an
ADORE process structure.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE COMPLETE CCCMS
We define a generic RBAC-XACML fragment that im-
plements XACML logic in order to i) determine which
roles a given user has (e.g.,FirstAidWorker coordinator) and
Fragment xacmlPolicyEnforcementPoint<u, resource>
P
a1 (isValidUser) := cms::validateUser(u)
S
a2 (response) := pdp::xACMLrequest(resource)
isValidUser
t1 throw('Deny Access')
!isValidUser
h hook()
a3 (valuesList) := pip::getAttributeValues(u)
a4 (access) := pdp::compare(response,valuesList)
access !access
Figure 2. ADORE XACML Fragment.
Fragment retrieveVictimHistory<wrk>
P
h (id) := hook()
S
a1 (history) := hospitals::guessHistory(id)
t (c) := isNotNull(history)
!c a2 ui::displayHistory(wrk,history)
c
Figure 3. retrieveVictimHistory fragment
ii) determine if that role has access to a specific resource
(e.g., medical history information). This fragment contains
three basic XACML-RBAC operations: i) it validates user
with regard to roles defined in XACML policy file, ii) it
establishes which resources can be accessed by role, and
iii) establishes permission of role according to the resource.
This fragment could be woven in several orchestrations of
CCCMS, where the user accesses any critical resource.
The XACML security fragment (Fig. 2) for accessing
control is in itself a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), ac-
cording to the XACML request/response process defined
in [12]. This PEP captures the access request done by the
user, invokes to PDP for getting the policies related to a
request (cf. action a2 in Fig. 2), invokes the PIP for getting
the attributes of the policy found by the PDP (cf. action
Fragment retrieveVictimHistory<wrk>
P
h (id) := hook()
S
a1 (isValidUser) := cms::validateUser(wrk)
a1 (history) := hospitals::guessHistory(id)
t (c) := isNotNull(history)
!c a2 ui::displayHistory(wrk,history)
c
a2 (response) := pdp::xACMLrequest(id)
isValidUser
a8 throw('Deny Access')
!isValidUsera3 (valuesList) := pip::getAttributeValues(wrk)
a4 (access) := pdp::compare(response,valuesList)
access !access
Figure 4. retrieveVictimHistory, after composition with XACML fragment
a3 in Fig. 2), and then compares them with the attributes
of the access request for proceeding to allow or deny
the access (cf. action a4 in Fig. 2). The XACML access
control process is encapsulated in an ADORE fragment, and
subsequently this fragment can be integrated with larger
services orchestrations or fragments in order to adapt the
business process. Thus it is possible to adapt the workflow
through concern composition.
For example, the third step of main success scenario of
Execute Rescue Mission explicitly specifies: System requests
victims medical history information from all connected Hos-
pitalResourceSystems. FirstAidWorker administers first aid
procedures to victim. So, we can compose the XACML
fragment to retrieveVictimHistory fragment (Fig. 3) to sup-
port this specification. Figure 4 shows the result of the
composition. Figure 5(a) presents the orchestration Execute
Rescue Mission in its initial state, and Figure 5(b) the results
of the composition. In the same way we can weave the
XACML fragment in other CCCMS fragments. It can be
weaved in activities that represent calls to hospital services
in order to validate the access to medical history of victim
by FirstAidWorker or System roles.
Orchestration cms::execRescMission
rcv (wrk,crs,mis) := receive()
a1 (injRep) := ui::promptVictimDescription(wrk)
a2 (id) := ui::promptVictimIdentity(wrk)
a40 (hosp) := cms::identifyAppropriateHospital(injRep,mis.loc)
a41 ui::displayDestination(wrk,hosp)
a5 msgBus::wait4msg('info', 'leaving',wrk)
a6 msgBus::wait4msg('info', 'victimDropped',wrk)
a7 msgBus::send('status', 'success',mis)
rpl reply()
(a) Initial version
Orchestration cms::execRescMission
rcv (wrk,crs,mis) := receive()
a1 (injRep) := ui::promptVictimDescription(wrk)
a2 (id) := ui::promptVictimIdentity(wrk)
a40 (hosp) := cms::identifyAppropriateHospital(injRep,mis.loc)
a9 (isValidUser) := cms::validateUser(wrk)
...
a10 (response) := pdp::xACMLrequest(id)
isValidUser
a13 throw('Deny Access')
!isValidUser a11 (valuesList) := pip::getAttributeValues(wrk)
a12 (access) := pdp::compare(response,valuesList)
!access
a14 (history) := hospitals::guessHistory(id)
access
a19 (c) := isNotNull(history)
a15 ui::displayHistory(history,wrk) !c
c
(b) After composition with additional concerns
Figure 5. The ExecuteRescueMission orchestration
V. DERIVING OTHER SECURITY FRAGMENTS
Through XACML fragment previously exposed, it is
possible to deduce a complex context of critical information
exchange in CCCMS where having access control rules is
not enough for preventing malicious appropriation of the
information that will be exchanged between the CCCMS
and all hospitals resources to which it connects to consult
the medical history of a victim. This type of information
is considered highly protected due to legal and ethical im-
plications. Works like [13] and [14] proposed strengthening
and flexibility of access control mechanisms to incorporate
encryption operations in the exchange of information, so
that only users with valid access privileges are responsible
to decrypt and access medical information.
We propose a small generic fragments to manage decryp-
tion behaviors using RSA - X.509 based standard, according
to CCCMS security requirement (All communications in the
system shall use secure channels compliant with AES 128
encryption standard), depicted in Figure 6. This fragment
can be composed with XACML and retrieveVictimHistory
fragments: we interlace it with XACML fragment, desen-
crytping the message (Victim History) that arrives from an
hospital. Once users with valid access control privileges is
established. Figure 7(a) shows the composition of decrypt
and XACML fragment. Finally, Figure 7(b) presents the
adapted Execute Rescue Mission orchestration with the addi-
tion of three news fragments for managing secure operations.
Fragment aes128DesencryptionResult<type>
P
h (res) := hook()
S
a1 (res) := des::desencrypt(res,type)
Figure 6. RSA X.509 desencryption operation defined as a fragment
Fragment merged
a1 (res) := des::desencrypt(res,'AES')
S
a5 (isValidUser) := cms::validateUser(u)
a6 (response) := pdp::xACMLrequest(resource)
isValidUser
a12 throw('Deny Access')
!isValidUsera7 (valuesList) := pip::getAttributeValues(u)
a8 (access) := pdp::compare(response,valuesList)
!access
a15 (res) := hook()
access
P
(a) Composing decrypt and XACML fragments
Orchestration cms::execRescMission
rcv (wrk,crs,mis) := receive()
a1 (injRep) := ui::promptVictimDescription(wrk)
a2 (id) := ui::promptVictimIdentity(wrk)
a40 (hosp) := cms::identifyAppropriateHospital(injRep,mis.loc)
a16 (isValidUser) := cms::validateUser(wrk)
...
a17 (response) := pdp::xACMLrequest(id)
isValidUser
a20 throw('Deny Access')
!isValidUser a18 (valuesList) := pip::getAttributeValues(wrk)
a19 (access) := pdp::compare(response,valuesList)
!access
a22 (history) := hospitals::guessHistory(id)
access
a21 (history) := des::desencrypt(history,'AES')
a27 (c) := isNotNull(history)
a23 ui::displayHistory(history,wrk) !c
c
(b) Resulting Execute Rescue Mission orchestration
Figure 7. Final orchestration: ExecRescMission ⊕ (requestVictimHistory ⊕ (decrypt ⊕ XACML))
VI. RELATED WORK
A. SoC applied to business process
The design and implementation of business workflows can
be viewed as high-level programming, where management
functionality and quality attributes characterize the blocks
within a workflow. Process modeling techniques can be
used to provide explicit representations of the relationships
between enterprise applications, business workflows sections
and quality attributes. Process models provide the conceptual
basis to define when and under what conditions business
applications are invoked in the context of integration sce-
narios [15], such the integration between business process
definition and RBAC security exposed in this work. Prin-
ciples derived from AOSD and MDD provide a high degree
of flexibility: AOSD can be applied to identify common
concerns and visualize scenarios where those concerns can
be applied throughout the business process that is being
automated in a workflow; model process can be adapted to
get new requirements, and further changes to models process
can be applied immediately to adapt business processes.
Sa´nchez et al [16] proposed the concept of Early Aspect
to focus on the identification and separation of common con-
cerns in requirements specification and system architecture
levels, by combining aspect oriented development principles
and model-driven development (MDD). In [17] authors
proposed the use of cross-cutting aspects for Enterprise
Architecture modeling, so cross-cutting aspects refer to EA-
related concepts, likegoals, standards, lifecycle or projects,
which may exert influence on other concepts of the EA
model.
B. Security in traditional business process approaches
Business processes are built by combining services
through a process specification language. This language de-
termines the tasks and the order in which these tasks should
be executed. The Business Process Execution Language
(BPEL) has become the de facto language to implement
business processes based on web services. However, despite
of the significant progress that has led to the development of
a language for business process, major changes relating to
the handling of quality attributes need to be managed before
workflow execution.BPEL does not provide any support
for specifying authorization policies or constrains over the
execution of activities of a business process.
Paci et al in [18] expose an approach for encompassing the
BPEL processes resiliency problem in RBAC-WS-BPEL,
an authorization BPEL model that supports the specifica-
tion of authorizations for the execution of BPEL process
activities by roles and users and authorization constraints.
Authors in [19] also propose an access control model called
BPEL4RBAC in order to secure BPEL codes. Our proposal
raise the level of abstraction and works on business process
models instead of raw source code.
C. Access Control and Business Processes
There have been previous attempts for deriving RBAC
control access policies from high abstraction levels that
combine Model-driven approaches and Aspects Oriented
development. In [20] authors propose the formalization of
a translation process of access-control policies into aspect
code. They propose the role slice concept which denotes
a set of class methods that a given role can access, and
represents the separate concern that captures permissions
for roles. Role-slice access-control policy (RBAC require-
ments) are translated to an aspect-oriented programming
(AOP) enforcement code. Braga in [7] proposes a MDA
approach for supporting the specification and validation
of code generation for control access policies, targeting
an aspect-based infrastructure. His proposal contains i) a
code generator that is a transformation from SecureUML
models, and ii) a language Aspects for Access Control
(AAC) which is proposed by the author in order to map
the transformation from SecureUML models. In [21] authors
propose role-based access control policies for Web Services
using Layered Model-driven architectures and Agile model-
ing security principles for enhancing security requirements.
Authors use Agile Methods that support concerns testing
throughout acceptance tests and model driven approaches
for specifying models that support the integration of Ag-
ile Modeling with Security Activities. However, the above
proposals do not considerate the reuse of orchestrations
that implement standards such as RBAC and XACML
and their introduction into business processes. Additionally,
these previous attempts do not consider the encapsulation of
special behaviours derived from quality attributes as security,
using aspectual cluster of services invocations. Instead, the
proposals are oriented to aspect code generation from RBAC
policies expressed in class models that represent control
access requirements.
Gronmo proposes in [22] the use of algebraic graph
transformation for specifying BPEL aspects at the modeling
level, but his work does not encompass concerns derived
from quality attributes such security. Authors in [23] propose
an aspect-oriented extension to BPMN called AO4BPMN
under the motivation of incorporating aspect-oriented con-
cepts in business process modeling languages; this proposal
is intended to resolve the lack for expressing concerns
in BPMN and business process modeling languages, but
AO4BPMN does not include information about how to
weave the aspects with a base model. In our proposal we
show the weaving between fragments in order to add new
behaviours (concerns) derived from control access security
considerations into a workflow previously conceived.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work describes an approach for integrating concerns
derived from security requirements (control access and en-
cryption operations) into legacy process. Our work proposes
to include security properties into a business workflow
at business modeling level, controlling its impact on the
business process itself, and managing several concerns that
intertwine with each other. We have shown how concerns
derived from security properties can be managed in an
efficient, maintainable, reusable and extensible way at model
level, according to the context, variations of rules and
requirements of business process, and using service secure
standards. Concretely, we have built ADORE fragments for
representing security services calls and woven them (in
AOD terminology) with previous fragments and orchestra-
tions that represent legacy business process. In particular
we have defined a control access concern as a fragment that
invokes existing XACML services in a typical role based
access context.
We have applied this approach to secure a common case
study (CCCMS) that involves multiple concerns that affect
the business processes. We have shown how this approach
supports the integration of concerns by several experts, with-
out adding some extra mechanism for supporting weaving of
concerns : an expert defines an enrichment of the business
process according with a specific business requirement, and
another secures the business process by incorporating secure
operations as role- based access control and encryption.
If the composition is managed at the middleware level,
the first expert is not aware of the change in the process.
In particular it is here that we can find security needs
such as the emergency access to confidential information.
Conversely, the security expert must ensure the protection
in all information access during the adjustment process.
This approach has been useful for taming the complexity
of concerns integration in early stages of business process
building, without radical extensions or modifications to
languages such WS-BPEL and BPEL.
For future work, we would like to explore automatic
compositions of sets of fragments according to ”concern
directives”. We plan also to dig further for optimizing the
result of weavings in multiple business processes.
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